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Algeria’s Enduring Partnership with China: A Strategic Calculus Beyond Trade Imbalance

Algeria and China share a relationship forged in anti-colonial solidarity, predating even Algeria’s independence. This deep historical bond, often invoked in diplomatic exchanges, has evolved significantly, culminating in a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” However, beneath the declarations of “win-win” cooperation, Algeria navigates a complex economic reality marked by a substantial trade imbalance and the challenge of translating large-scale infrastructure projects into sustainable domestic industrial growth. This article explores how Algeria seeks to leverage its long-standing alliance with Beijing for strategic autonomy and economic diversification, while grappling with the practicalities of a global partnership.
From Revolutionary Friendship to Enduring Goodwill
The roots of this unique alliance stretch back to 1958, when Beijing became the first non-Arab nation to recognize the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic during its war of liberation. Algeria reciprocated in 1971, playing a pivotal role in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, which restored the People’s Republic of China’s legitimate seat at the United Nations. This foundation of mutual support, described by both sides as “revolutionary friendship,” is more than mere rhetoric; it underpins a remarkable, enduring legacy.
Perhaps the most tangible testament to this bond is China’s medical mission to Algeria, initiated in 1963. This was the People’s Republic’s very first overseas medical dispatch, a program that has endured for over six decades, surviving political shifts in both nations. By 2023, Chinese figures reported 3,522 medical personnel had treated over 27 million patients and assisted more than two million births in Algeria, focusing on priority areas like obstetrics and acupuncture in provincial hospitals. This enduring humanitarian effort fosters significant goodwill, showcasing a form of cooperation that predates contemporary global health diplomacy.
Economic Boom and Strategic Elevation
The economic dimension of the relationship expanded dramatically from the late 1990s and early 2000s. Algeria’s extensive public investment programs, fueled by hydrocarbon revenues, created immense demand for rapid infrastructure development. Chinese state-owned enterprises, adept at mobilizing vast workforces and financing, quickly became major players in housing, roads, public buildings, and water infrastructure. Sinopec’s entry into upstream oil operations at Zarzaitine in 2002 signaled a deepening energy engagement. This era saw China displace France as Algeria’s leading source of imports, fundamentally reshaping its trade landscape.
A significant diplomatic milestone arrived in February 2014, when Algeria became the first Arab state to forge a comprehensive strategic partnership with China. This high-level alignment was followed by successive five-year cooperation plans, the latest covering 2022–2026. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s state visit to Beijing in July 2023 further broadened the agenda, extending cooperation beyond traditional infrastructure to include petrochemicals, mining, agriculture, aerospace, civil nuclear technology, renewable energy, education, and defence.
Navigating the Trade Imbalance
Despite the strategic rhetoric, the economic partnership presents a clear imbalance. According to Algerian-reported UN Comtrade data for 2024, imports from China reached approximately US$10.58 billion (22.3% of all Algerian imports), while exports to China amounted to just US$1.99 billion (3.8% of Algeria’s total exports), resulting in a bilateral goods deficit of roughly US$8.6 billion. Chinese-reported figures indicate an even larger gap, with China exporting around US$11.68 billion to Algeria and importing only about US$800 million, implying a surplus closer to US$10.9 billion.
Regardless of the statistical discrepancies, the reality is a substantial trade deficit for Algeria. Its exports to China are not only far smaller but also heavily concentrated in mineral fuels and petroleum products. Crucially, Europe remains Algeria’s dominant energy customer, receiving 63.8% of its exports in 2024. This highlights China’s role as a major supplier of goods and services, but a comparatively minor market for Algerian products, underscoring the challenge of achieving true economic reciprocity.
Landmarks and Lingering Questions
Chinese firms have left an indelible mark on Algeria’s landscape, delivering monumental projects. These include the central and western sections of the 1,216-kilometre East–West Highway, the architectural marvel that is the Great Mosque of Algiers – Africa’s largest mosque, inaugurated in February 2024 – and 575 kilometres of the 950-kilometre Western Mining Railway, designed to link crucial mining sites to ports. The railway’s opening in February 2026 exemplifies a shift towards industrial diversification, reflecting Algeria’s ambition to move beyond simple resource extraction.
However, the path of cooperation is not without its hurdles. High-profile projects, like the El Hamdania/Cherchell deep-water port (originally budgeted at US$3.3 billion), were suspended in 2019, with its fate remaining uncertain as of July 31, 2026. Similarly, a planned US$7 billion integrated phosphate project, announced in 2022 as a joint venture, has undergone restructuring, with its original ownership and financing structure now unclear following a June 2025 contract award to Saipem for engineering design. These instances underscore that strategic endorsements, while powerful, do not guarantee timely or transparent project delivery, often influenced by Algerian internal processes and financing dynamics.
Energy and Defence: A Measured Diversification
China’s role in Algeria’s energy sector is expanding beyond occasional upstream participation to a broader presence across the hydrocarbon value chain. Sinopec, a consistent partner since 2002, secured a production-sharing contract for Hassi Berkane North in February 2025, involving an estimated US$850 million investment. Chinese companies have also won new gas exploration acreage and contracts for refinery upgrades at Arzew and extensive pipeline inspections. While Europe remains Algeria’s principal energy customer due to geographical proximity and pipeline infrastructure, China is steadily deepening its footprint as an upstream partner, engineering contractor, and technology provider.
In defence, cooperation with China is meaningful but serves primarily as a diversification strategy, not a replacement for Algeria’s long-standing ties with Russia. Between 2020 and 2024, Russia accounted for 48% of Algeria’s arms imports, with China contributing 19% (including armed drones) and Germany 14%, according to SIPRI data. The November 2023 visit by Algeria’s Chief of Staff, General Saïd Chanegriha, to China, including discussions with top military and defence industry figures, further cemented this diversification. This approach aligns with Algeria’s traditional non-alignment policy, as affirmed by President Tebboune in 2026, maintaining good relations with multiple global powers without excessive dependence on any single partner.
Algerian Perspectives: Scrutiny Amidst Favourability
Public sentiment in Algeria towards China generally appears positive. An Arab Barometer survey from 2021–2022 found 67% of Algerian respondents held a favorable view of China, significantly higher than the 47% for the United States. A majority either wished for stronger economic ties (38%) or for them to remain at current levels (41%).
However, this positive perception coexists with a more critical domestic discourse. While state media often champion the historical friendship and “win-win” narratives, economic reporting and commentary in other outlets delve into the trade deficit, local job creation, subcontracting practices, technology transfer, and project delays. Concerns have also been voiced in some regional media regarding Morocco’s perceived faster success in attracting Chinese industrial and export-oriented investment, particularly in sectors like ports, electric vehicles, and manufacturing for export. This nuanced perspective reflects a broader Algerian ambition for the partnership to deliver concrete, sustainable benefits beyond mere transactional exchanges.
The Path Forward: From Transactions to Transformation?
While cultural ties, such as the new Confucius Institute at the University of Algiers II (opened September 23, 2025) and the Great Mosque of Algiers (a joint masterpiece), are expanding, they are less deeply embedded in Algerian society than its connections with the Arab world or France. For many Algerians, China is primarily encountered through consumer goods, business dealings, and large-scale construction, rather than through linguistic or familial bonds.
Looking ahead to 2030, the Algeria-China relationship is poised for managed deepening rather than a sudden transformation or alliance. Chinese firms will likely remain crucial across various sectors, from railways and mining to hydrocarbons and telecommunications. Algeria will continue its strategy of diversifying its economic ties beyond Europe while ensuring market access and upholding its strategic autonomy.
The critical question for this evolving partnership is whether it can foster durable Algerian industrial capacity alongside Chinese commercial activity. The extension of zero-tariff treatment to Algerian imports by China on May 1, 2026, represents a potential step towards market rebalancing. Yet, tariffs are just one barrier; Algerian exporters must still meet Chinese standards, establish distribution networks, and scale up productive capacity. The true measure of a more balanced partnership will lie in sustained local employment, robust Algerian subcontracting, genuine technical training, effective technology transfer, and a significant boost in domestic non-hydrocarbon production. Without such a shift, the political warmth and extensive infrastructure cooperation may endure, but the economic relationship will likely remain characterized by its current, significant imbalance.



