South Sudan in November 2025: A Nation Teetering on the Brink

November 2025 emerged as a critical month for South Sudan, as the world’s youngest nation faced intensifying armed conflicts, a collapsing peace agreement, severe humanitarian crises, and growing warnings from international observers that the country could slide back into full-scale civil war. The convergence of internal political dysfunction, regional instability, and humanitarian catastrophe painted a grim picture for a nation that has known little peace since gaining independence in 2011.

UN Warns of “Breaking Point” in Peace Process

On November 11, senior UN officials delivered a stark warning to the Security Council that South Sudan was entering a period of rising instability marked by political polarization, renewed armed clashes, and severe humanitarian strain. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, head of UN peace operations, cautioned that a “breaking point is becoming visible” in the peace process, as core commitments under the landmark 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement stalled or went into reverse.

The 2018 agreement had been designed as the key safeguard against renewed civil war, establishing power-sharing arrangements between President Salva Kiir’s government and opposition forces led by First Vice President Riek Machar. However, by November 2025, these arrangements had almost entirely eroded. Political reshuffles removed opposition representatives and replaced them with members of splinter factions, while the opposition made counter-appointments in areas under its control, resulting in the reemergence of parallel governance structures.

Lacroix emphasized that “the principle of inclusivity that underpinned the agreement appears to have been sacrificed”. Progress on critical transitional tasks including security sector reform, constitution-making, and election planning remained completely stalled, while regional mechanisms failed to de-escalate local tensions.

Intensifying Military Clashes Across Multiple States

November witnessed a dramatic escalation in armed conflict across South Sudan, particularly in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Equatoria states. Active hostilities, including ground attacks and airstrikes, continued between armed groups and the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), resulting in widespread civilian casualties and displacement.

Government forces conducted repeated aerial and riverine offensives targeting opposition positions, while opposition forces and allied militias carried out ambushes and counterattacks. The violence resulted in devastating consequences for civilians, with UN documentation showing 41 people killed, 65 injured, and 18 abducted in just four major incidents during the reporting period.

In Western Equatoria State alone, an estimated 226,564 people were displaced across multiple counties due to intensified clashes. Additional displacement occurred in Baliet County, where 6,017 people fled violence, and in Torit, Eastern Equatoria, where 5,469 individuals were forced from their homes. The scale of displacement reflected the geographic spread of the conflict, which now affected nearly all regions of the country.

Humanitarian Workers Under Attack

The deteriorating security situation took a particularly deadly toll on humanitarian operations in November. On November 14, intercommunal violence in Baliet County, Upper Nile, killed one aid worker and two community volunteers and destroyed the Adong health and nutrition facility serving over 15,000 people. The destruction of this facility left thousands without essential healthcare services, dramatically increasing risks of disease and malnutrition among already vulnerable populations.

Throughout the month, humanitarian organizations reported 58 access incidents that disrupted the delivery of critical assistance. On November 4 and 26, two aid workers were abducted by armed individuals while traveling between Yei and Morobo. In Juba, the capital, an expatriate NGO staff member was attacked and injured during a robbery at a guesthouse, while humanitarian organization funds were stolen at gunpoint along Airport Road.

The escalating violence forced humanitarian organizations to evacuate personnel from conflict zones. Fourteen humanitarian workers were relocated from Pieri and Lankien to Juba, while four additional aid workers were evacuated from Torit in Eastern Equatoria to the capital. These evacuations severely constrained the ability of organizations to deliver assistance to populations in desperate need.

Government Demands Massive UN Peacekeeping Cuts

In a move that alarmed international observers, the South Sudanese government in November demanded that the United Nations drastically scale back its peacekeeping mission (UNMISS). The government called for withdrawing 70 percent of international peacekeeping forces, grounding UN helicopters, and closing operating bases and civilian protection sites.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix warned the UN Security Council that gutting the peacekeeping force’s presence would jeopardize the mission and its mandate to protect civilians. Human Rights Watch noted that the call should ring alarm bells as civilians in South Sudan face grave abuses, pointing out that the UN had already begun planning to close offices and reduce staff due to funding constraints.

The timing of the government’s demand was particularly troubling given the surge in violence. UNMISS documented 129 violations of the status of forces agreement between July and September, with 111 involving government-imposed movement restrictions affecting UN patrols in nine states. The September reporting showed a twofold increase in civilian casualties by warring parties compared with 2024.

Catastrophic Humanitarian Crisis Deepens

The humanitarian situation in South Sudan during November 2025 reached catastrophic levels. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification reported that 1.3 million people needed urgent food aid, while residents of Nasir and Fangak faced imminent risk of famine. The government’s restrictions on aid access to conflict-affected areas controlled by opposition forces further compounded the crisis.

The situation was exacerbated by the ongoing spillover from the war in neighboring Sudan. Since April 2023, more than 1.2 million people had crossed into South Sudan, including refugees and South Sudanese returnees fleeing the conflict between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces. This influx, equivalent to over seven percent of South Sudan’s population, placed enormous strain on already limited resources and infrastructure.

Amy Pope, director general of the UN’s International Organization for Migration, emphasized that Sudan had created the world’s largest displacement crisis, with nearly 14 million people displaced internally or forced to flee to impoverished neighboring countries. The spillover into South Sudan included not only people but also weapons, fighters being recruited by both sides in Sudan’s war, and destabilizing security dynamics.

Bureaucratic Impediments and Administrative Harassment

Beyond the direct violence, humanitarian operations in November faced persistent bureaucratic and administrative obstacles that hampered the delivery of assistance. In Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Western Bahr El Ghazal states, organizations encountered mandatory travel permit requirements for all missions departing Malakal, pressure from officials to use state-owned armed escorts, and demands for 20,000 South Sudanese pounds to approve NGO job advertisements.

These impediments reflected the government’s broader strategy of controlling and limiting humanitarian access, particularly in areas controlled by opposition forces. The restrictions forced aid organizations to navigate complex and often arbitrary requirements while populations in need faced increasing desperation.

Elections Postponed Again: Democracy Deferred

The backdrop to November’s violence was the repeated postponement of South Sudan’s first-ever general elections. Originally scheduled for December 2024, the elections had been pushed back to December 2026 in September 2024, marking the fourth postponement in less than a decade. By November 2025, it was increasingly clear that even this new deadline was unrealistic.

The postponement reflected the government’s failure to complete essential prerequisites including conducting a national census, drafting a permanent constitution, reforming the security sector, and unifying armed forces. Critics argued that the transitional government, particularly President Kiir and Vice President Machar, had little incentive to rush into elections that could threaten their hold on power. As long as the transition remained in force, they could continue governing without electoral legitimacy while accessing state resources.

Nicholas Haysom, the UN Special Representative for South Sudan, had warned in a November briefing that the latest extension could not be “business as usual” and that without immediate action, the country could find itself in the same predicament when the December 2026 deadline arrived. He proposed six achievable benchmarks including deploying unified forces, launching civic education, preparing for voter registration, and developing a code of conduct for political parties and media.

Regional Spillover and External Pressures

The conflict in Sudan continued to destabilize South Sudan throughout November. Reports emerged of clashes between Rapid Support Forces fighters and opposition forces in Upper Nile, while suspicions grew that Sudan’s army had reactivated ties to Nuer militias. The war in Sudan also disrupted South Sudan’s oil exports, as drone attacks in mid-November struck oil facilities in the Heglig area and White Nile State, temporarily disrupting crude production.

This was particularly devastating for South Sudan, which relies on oil exports for the vast majority of government revenue. The attacks underscored the deep economic interdependence between the two nations and how Sudan’s conflict directly threatened South Sudan’s financial stability. In late November, Oxfam warned that almost half of South Sudan’s population faced acute hunger, highlighting the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding across the country.

Culture of Impunity and Lack of Accountability

A fundamental obstacle to peace and stability remained the pervasive culture of impunity throughout South Sudan. Neither the government nor opposition groups had held perpetrators within their own ranks accountable for past or current atrocities. The Hybrid Court, a key transitional justice mechanism mandated by the 2018 peace agreement, had not been established despite the signing of related legislation.

This lack of accountability fueled resentment and recurring cycles of violence. Civilians suffered grave abuses including killings, forced displacement, sexual violence, and violations against children by all sides, yet perpetrators faced no consequences. The failure to establish functional transitional justice mechanisms reflected the political elite’s lack of genuine commitment to accountability and the rule of law.

International Community Struggles to Respond

The international community, including regional bodies like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union, struggled throughout November to formulate an effective response to South Sudan’s deteriorating situation. The Tumaini Peace Initiative, a Kenyan-hosted mediation effort aimed at bringing holdout groups into the peace process, had stalled after Vice President Machar withdrew in July, suspicious that President Kiir was using the process to dilute his party’s power.

Efforts to revive the Tumaini Initiative in early November yielded little progress, while guarantors of the 2018 peace agreement appeared unable or unwilling to pressure the parties to uphold their commitments. The UN Security Council faced the challenge of addressing South Sudan’s crisis while dealing with the government’s demand to drastically reduce the UN peacekeeping presence at precisely the moment when civilian protection was most needed.

A Nation at a Crossroads

As November 2025 drew to a close, South Sudan stood at a critical juncture. The fragile peace that had maintained a delicate balance among competing armed leaders since 2018 appeared on the verge of complete collapse. The convergence of multiple crises—military escalation, political dysfunction, humanitarian catastrophe, and regional instability—created conditions that experts warned could trigger a return to the kind of large-scale ethnic violence that characterized the 2013-2018 civil war.

The conflict between government and opposition forces had killed an estimated 400,000 people between 2013 and 2018, triggered famine, and created a massive refugee crisis. As both President Kiir and Vice President Machar were closely aligned with South Sudan’s two largest ethnic groups—the Dinka and Nuer respectively—observers feared that renewed full-scale conflict could quickly take on an ethnic dimension with potentially genocidal consequences.

International observers emphasized that without decisive action, South Sudan risked sliding into renewed war, with civilians once again bearing the heaviest cost. The month of November 2025 would be remembered as a period when the warning signs were clear, the international community was aware of the dangers, yet effective intervention remained elusive. For ordinary South Sudanese, who had endured decades of conflict and hoped that independence would bring peace and prosperity, November brought only more violence, displacement, and uncertainty about the future.

The question facing South Sudan as it entered December 2025 was whether its leaders would find the political will to step back from the brink, implement meaningful reforms, and prioritize the welfare of their citizens over personal power—or whether the world’s youngest nation would descend once more into the abyss of civil war.